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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACQUELINE RICCIUTI, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
JACK C. ROBINSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by Jacqueline Ricciuti, 
plaintiff and respondent, for damages sustained in an 
automobile accident which occurred on the 20th day of 
December, 1952, in a residential section of Ogden, Utah. 
The plaintiff was riding as a guest passentger in an 
auton1obile operated by Jack C. Robinson, the defendant 
and appellant herein. No other vehicle \vas involved. 
The trial of the case in the District Court in and for 
Weber County resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and 
against the defendant. 
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Appellant will contend herein that the evidence was 
not sufficient as a matter of law to go to the jury on the 
issue of "wilful misconduct." Appellant will further con-
tend that the court erred in its instructions to the jury 
in that an instruction was given relating to simple negli-
gence in this, a guest-pasenger case. 
STATMENT OF· FA errs 
Mrs. Ricciuti, at the time of this accident, resided 
at the Ben Lomond Hotel in Ogden, Utah. On the evening 
of the accident she had no specific plans and had "washed 
some things out and fell asleep." Before 10 :00 o'clock 
p.m. she had awakened, dressed and gone to the "Combo," 
which is a tavern a few doors south of the Ben Lomond 
Hotel on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. While 
there, she had a bottle of beer and talked for some time 
to the bartender. Plaintiff left the "Combo" intending 
to go to the "Washiki Club." She met Mary Johnson 
(also a passenger in the R,obinson vehicle at the tilne of 
the accident) in front of the "Washiki Club" and at the 
invitation of Miss Johnson, both 'vent to the "Hi-Hat" 
club in Roy, Utah, acco1npanied by a gentleman friend 
of Miss Johnson in his automobile. They arrived at the 
"Hi-Hat" about 5 minutes past 12 :00 midnight. Shortly 
thereafter, plaintiff was introduced to Mr. Robinson (the 
defendant) and a 1\.fr. Carnan and a _j[r. Toponc~. There 
were no tables at the •'Hi-Hat," so the 3 1nen invited 
plain tiff and l\{iss Johnson to accon1 pany the1n back to 
Ogden, and they went to the '•Double-B" on Wall Avenue 
and 19th Street in that city. "\Vhen the group arrived at 
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and returned to the cafe. 'l'hey stayed at the "Double-
B" until after 3 :00 a.m., whereupon the 2 couples left in 
Mr. Robinson's automobile and headed for Pineview 
Dam. Mr. Robinson and Miss Johnson were in the front 
seat; the plaintiff and J.\ifr. Carnan in the back seat. The 
weather, when they left the city, was clear, but it com-
menced to snow lightly at Pineview Dam. The roadway, 
however, was not slick, merely wet. On the return trip 
to the city, while the automobile 'vas traveling in the 
vicinity of 23rd Street and Harrison Boulevard, the 
defendant dropped a lighted cigarette in the folds of his 
topcoat and lost control of the automobile, which jumped 
the curb and traveled for some distance on the parking; 
then returned to the street. Plaintiff was thrown from 
the car and rendered temporarily unconscious. Shortly, 
thereafter, she was taken to the Dee Hospital by ambu-
lance. 
The above is a recitation of the facts in brief. 
Specific testimony relating to the facts will be gone into 
under the points of argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING A 
VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LEROY G. 
BENNETT'S TESTIMONY OVER THE OBJECTION OF 
COUNSEL. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE GIV-
ING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING A 
VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff introduced testimony from three \vitnesses 
relating to the facts pertinent to the happening of the 
accident. Mrs. Riccuiti testified in her own behalf, stat-
ing that no alcoholic beverage had been consumed by any 
of the parties from the time they met until the time of the 
accident. She noticed nothing unusual about the way the 
fellows acted, and stated further that they were not 
under the influence of intoxicants when she met them (R. 
18). In view of that testimony, intoxication 1nust, of 
course, be ruled out as an element in this guest-passenger 
case. 
As to the conduct and acts of the defendant in 
operating his vehicle, the plaintiff, Mrs. Riccuiti, had 
this to say: (R. 20) 
"Q. How: did he drive do\vn the canyon towards 
Ogden~ 
A. lie was driving very carefully. 
. . . . . ... 
Q. Tlien as I understand it, your first intinla-
tion or first kno\vledge of this accident was 
\vhen you suddenly felt the car joshling 
a.round. Is that right"? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You had no con1plaint or no concern about 
the 1nanner in which .l\fr. R.obinson was driv-
ing the car before tl1is joshling suddenly 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
occurred and the accident happened. 
A. That's right. I didn't think he was doing any-
thing wrong." 
Testifying further, she stated that later that morn-
ing at the hospital in the presence of herself and Miss 
Johnson, the defendant stated that Mary Johnson was 
asleep in the front seat with her head in his lap, and 
that he dropped a lighted cigarette in his lap·, and lost 
control of the car (R. 8). 
Sergeant LeRoy G. Bennett of the Ogden City Police 
F·orce called as a witness on behalf of plaintiff testified 
that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 4 :00 
a.m. and at that time, conducted an investigation (R. 34). 
Harrison Boulevard in the vicinity of 23rd Street is 
a residential area. There is a parking betvveen the side-
walk and the street which is planted in grass and has a 
row of trees along it. Sergeant Bennett determined that 
the path the vehicle took was visible on the parking, and 
that the tracks could be seen on the grass under the 
light snow which had just cornmenced to fall. Using 
plaintiff's Exhibit "A" for illustration, he traced the 
path of the vehicle from the street onto the parking and 
back onto the street. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" is repro-
duced in this brief for purposes of illustration). He 
determined that the vehicle left the roadway and ju1nped 
the curb in front of resident No. 2335 (Exhibit "A"), 
crossed the driveway between resident No. 2335 and 2341 
and that the right rear fender and lnunper ~truck a tree 
on the parking in front of residence No. 2;~41. The car 
continued on, and the right rear door 'va~ torn free fro1n 
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the vehicle as it struck a tree in front of residence No. 
2345. The vehicle continued, and returned to the roadway 
between residences 2353 and 2359. Mrs. Riccuiti and 
Mr. Carnan, the passengers in the back seat of the auto~ 
mobile, were thrown from it in front of residence No. 
2353, · and the positions in which they were found are 
n1arked with an X on plaintiff's Exhibit "A". The offi~ 
cer determined that the vehicle had traveled 192 feet 
on the curbing. When he carne upon the scene, the 
vehicle was parked on the street in front of the drive-
way separating residences 2359 and 2361. He had been 
told that the vehicle had been backed up from the point 
where it had come to rest, and determined that it had 
been backed up 174 feet. He concluded that the vehicle 
had traveled a distance of 373 feet from the time it left 
the roadway until the time it came to rest (R. 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38). After describing the path the vehicle took, and 
pointing out the two trees which had been struck, and 
the distances involved, Sergeant Bennett was asked by 
plaintiff's counsel if he had an opinion as to how fast 
the vehicle 'vas traveling at the ti1ne it jumped the curb. 
Over objection of eounsel, the court pern1i tted the officer 
to state his opinion. He said the vehicle was traveling 60 
miles per hour (R. 40). (That the court erred in allow-
ing this conclusion, is the subject of argu1nent under 
Point II of this Brief.) 
As part of Sergeant Bennett's investigation, he 
asked the defendant what caused the. rar t,o go out of 
control and on the parking. He testified that defendant 
t.old hin1 that l\lary Johnson \Ya~ asleep 'vith her head 
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1n his lap, and that he dropped a cigarette in his lap 
and looked down for it, and the next thing he knew, the 
car was bumping over the driveway. The officer also 
stated that the defendant told hi1n that he was traveling 
40 miles per hour just before the accident. 
Officer Verne B. Lundgren of the Ogden City Police 
Force also testified on behalf of p~aintiff, but his testi-
mony is largely repetitious, and added nothing to that 
already testified to by Sargeant Bennett. 
The above testimony, in substance, is the facts upon 
which the plaintiff relies to support her clain1 for dam-
ages under the Utah Guest Statute. 
Jack C. Robinson, in his own behalf, testified to the 
following facts in regard to the happening of the acci-
dent: (R. 80) 
"A. And then what happened as you drove on 
down onto Harrison Avenue~ Just tell the 
court and jury in your own words and speak 
loud enough so they can hear you. Just tell 
them 'vhat happened and what you did~ 
A. I drove on down until I got to Harrison 
Boulevard and turned south and I got down 
to, well, just past 23rd and was about the mid-
dle of the block, I dropped the cigarette down 
in the folds of my top coat. 
Q. Now, where a bouts did that cigarette lite. If 
you remember' 
A. Right in the middle of my lap. 
Q. Did you have a top coat on at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did yon do v1hen you dropped that 
cigarette·~ 
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A. Tried to pick it up at first and couldn't get 
hold of it. I brushed at it and sparks flew. 
I looked down just a se0ond to see where it 
went and the next thing I hit the curb and it 
spun the wheel out of my hands. 
Q. What did you do after the wheel spun out of 
your hands~ Do you recall what happened 
then~ As near as you can recall~ 
A. I fought the car back. It was heading back 
to,vards the trees. I fought to get back 
tovvard the road there. I seen the front door 
come open and Mary started to slide out. I 
reached with one hand to hold 4er and when 
I got back on the road, I stopped to see how 
the rest of them was hurt. They were over 
on the parkvvay and I backed up to where 
they were." 
He stated that he had a conservation with the offi-
cers after the accident, but said that at no time did he 
say that Mary J·ohnson was asleep 'vith her head in his 
lap. As to the speed of the automobile he told the offi-
cers he was traveling between 35 and 40 mph. (R. 83). 
Mary Johnson, testified that she wa.s sitting next 
to defendant and that she was at his side when she went 
·to sleep and didn't remember after she fell asleep 
whether or not her head was on his shoulder (R. 89). 
She was present at the time :Thfr. Robinson was interro-
gated by the officers :;tnd, to her knowledge, defendant 
did not say that she was laying with her head in his lap. 
When the evidence as to facts of the accident pre-
sented by both sides is examined, they show simply a 
driver of an automobile dropping a lighted cigarette into 
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the folds of his clothing, and in his atte1npt to locate 
the burning object, losing control of the auton1obile. Up 
to that point the vehicle was operated in a careful and 
prudent manner. There was no apprehension of danger 
and certainly nothing to be apprehensive about. That 
fact is uncontroverted. All parties concerned testified 
that the manner of operation of the vehicle was careful 
The only conflict in the testi1nony was lVIiss John-
son's position in the front seat. However, whether she 
was laying with her head in defendant's lap as contended 
by plaintiff, or whether she was asleep next to defend-
ant, is immaterial, because obviously it had no effect on 
defendant's manner of operation. And too, he would 
be equally concerned with dropping a lighted cigarette 
in the folds of his own clothing or on the clothing of 
someone else. The only act, then, which can possibly be 
construed to give rise to liability on the part of defend-
ant, is the dropping of a lighted cigarette, and that act 
can amount to no more than an act of momentary inad-
vertence or inattention. That such act on the part of 
a motor vehicle operator could be construed to be negli-
gence is perhaps true, but it is equally true that such an 
act cannot be 'vilful misconduct under the Utah Guest 
statute as that term is ordinarily understood and defined. 
U.C.A., 1953, 49-9-1: 
". . . . Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued as relieving the ovvner, or driver, or person 
responsible for the operation of a vehicle from 
liability for injury to, or death of, such guest 
proximately resulting from the intoxication or 
wilful misconduct of sueh o'vner, driver or person 
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responsible for the operation of such vehicle .... " 
In Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P. 2d 594, (Utah), this court 
with apparent approval of the lower court's instructions 
defined the term "Wilful misconduct" as follows: 
''th·e intentional doing of an act or intentional 
omitting or failing to do an act, with knowledge 
that serious injury is a probably and not merely 
a possible result, or the intentional doing of an 
act with wanton and reckless disregard of the 
possible consequences." 
The authorities are in accord with that definition. 
See Blashfield's' Cyclopedia of Autom-obile Law, Vol. 4, 
Sec. 2322. 
"Willful misconduct is the intentional doing 
of s·omething which should not be done, or inten-
tional failure to do something which should be 
done, in the operation of the automobile, under 
cir~umstances tending to disclose the operator's 
knowledge, express or implied, that an injury to 
the guest will be a probable result of such con-
duet." S.ee also 60 C.J.S. 1001. 
Clearly an act of n1omentary inadvertence is not con-
templated within the definition of "wilful misconduct" 
because such an act is not characterized by the kn au· ledge 
that doing the act will result in probable serious injury. 
In the cases cited below it vvill be sho,vn that courts in 
various jurisdictions have dealt "\Vith the proble1n accord-
ingly. 
Neyens v. Gehl, 15 N.W. 2d 888, (Iovva) 
This action \vas by a guest against his host for 
injuries sustained in an ~uton1obile accident. There vvere 
five passengers in the vehicle. Just before the accident, 
10 
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the defendant requested plaintiff ('vho was in the back 
seat) to light and hand him a cigarette. The cigarette 
was passed to the girl who was sitting in the front seat 
and dropped by the defendant driver when handed to 
hin1. He momentarily took his eyes frorn the road while 
reaching for the cigarette, and the vehicle struck a bridge 
abutment and overturned. There was a dispute in the 
evidence as to how fast the vehicle \vas traveling. The 
jury could have found that the vehicle was traveling up 
to 60 mph. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendant. Plaintiff n1oved for a new trial on the ground 
that the court erred in its ruling certain of plaintiff's 
evidence and also erred in its instructions. ·The lower 
court ruled that the motion of the defendant for a 
directed verdict should have been granted and, therefore, 
stated that the other alleged errors need not be con-
sidered. Plaintiff appealed. 
The court held : 
"The court's holding that, if the defendants' 
n1otion for directed verdict should have been sus-
tained, any error in the instructions \Vould be 
without prejudice, was clearly sound. (Citing 
cases). We are also of the opinion and hold that 
the court was right in its final detern1ination that 
defendants' motion for a directed verdict should 
have been sustained .... 
"In Harvey v. Clark, 2:-32 J owa 729, 732, 6 N.W. 
2d 144, we held that failure to see a train in ti1ne 
to avoid colliding \v1th it at a c-rossing did not 
constitute recklessness, stating as follows: 
"'~ro constitute reckle;~;~;ness under the guest 
statute, conduct rnu~t he rnore than negligent and 
must manifest a heedless disregard for or jndif-
lJ 
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ference to the consequences or the rights or safety 
of others. It need not involve n1oral turpitude nor 
wanton and willful C{)nduct. (citing cases). We 
have frequently said that conduct arising fron1 
n1ere inadverence, thoughtlessness, or error of 
judgment is not reckless.' 
"In the case of Wilson v. Oxborro,v, 220 Iowa 
1135, 265 N.W. 1, we held that a driver, who 
approached a bridge around a ten degree curve 
a-straddle the black lines in the center of the pave-
ment at 40 miles per hour, confining his view to 
the black lines so that he did not see an approach-
ing truck until 75 feet therefrom and thereupon 
swerved to ther right side-swiping the truck, re-
sulting in fatal injuries to a guest, was not reck-
less. In the case of Shenkle v. Mains, 216 Iowa 
1324, 24 7 N.vV. 635, the driver failed to observe 
an approaching car in time to avoid side-swiping 
it, resulting in fatal injuries to a guest and we 
also held that a case of recklessness had not been 
made out. In Roberts v. Koons, 230 Iowa 92, 296 
N. vV. 811, the driver failed to observe a parked 
truck while driving through sno'v flurries, col-
lided with it, resulting in fatal injury to a guest 
and we held it as recklessness had not been shown. 
In Tomasek v. Lynch, 233 Iowa 662, 10 N.W. 2d 
3, a driver failed to recognize a "T" intersection 
in time to avoid driving into the ditch and we 
reversed the trial court's refusal to direct a ver-
dict on the ground that recklessness had not been 
shown. 
"In all of the cases above cited there was 
some inadvertence, thoughtlessness or error in 
judgrnent, 'vhirh 'vould prohably support a claim 
of actionable negligence but the evidence failed 
. ' to sho'v heedles~ disregard for or indifference to 
the eonequences or right or safety of others. So 
12 
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it is here. \Ve find no decision of this court that 
seems t·o be directly analgous. Decisions from 
other courts, however, definitely support our 
position." 
Ringe v. Holbrook, 149 A. 231, (Conn.) 
Plaintiff \vas riding as a guest 111 an automobile 
operated by the defendant, sitting next to the defendant. 
The automobile was traveling the road at a high speed, 
but at a speed 'vhich the court deen1ed not excessive 
under the circun1stances. Both plaintiff and defendant 
testified that while so traveling the presence of a bee 
was noticed in the front seat. Defendant momentarily 
took her right hand off the wheel to reach for the bee and 
at that moment the aut~omobile left the road and struck 
a fence, causing plaintiff's injuries. The jury returned 
a verdict for the plaintiff which was set aside by the 
lo\ver court on motion of the defendant. Plaintiff 
appealed from that order. 
Court held: "The whole evidence shows be-
yond doubt that the accident \Vas due to the fact 
that the attention of the defendant was momen-
tarily distracted fron1 the operation of the car 
because of a not unnatural reaction to the pres-
ence of the bee near or on her person. The trial 
court was right in concluding that the situation 
could not reasonably be held to disclose a reck-
less and heedless disregard by the defendant of 
the rights of the plaintiff, within the ter1ns of our 
statute restricting the right of recovery by a guest 
in an automobile." 
Bashor 'li. Bashor et al., 85 TT. 2d 732, (Colo.) 
The vehicle in this case rontained a radio dial \\'"hich 
'vas attached to the st~ering post. \\Thile proreeding 
l ') ,) 
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along an oiled high,vay at a speed .of about -!5 to 55 1nph 
the defendant withdrew his attention from the road and 
was engaged in dialing a station on this radio. His atten-
tion was directed to dailing the radio for so long a ti1ne 
that his vehicle overtook a slower moving vehicle. When 
his attention was called to this fact by a passt;nger he 
' ' 
was unable to bring his car under control and it veered 
to the left and overturned. This action was brought by 
a guest in the automobile under the Colorado Guebt 
Statute which provides in substance that a guest may 
not recover fron1 his host unless the host be guilty of 
intoxication or "negligence consisting of wilful and 
wanton disregard of the rights of others." The plaintiff 
received a. verdict below and defendant appeals from the 
refusal of the trial- court to grant his motion for a 
directed verdict. · 
Court Held: "We think the evidence clearly 
is sufficient to support a finding of negligence; 
but unless the foregoing written statement is evi-
dence of 'a wilful and wanton disregard of the 
rights of others,' there is no such evidence in the 
record. The driver was a close friend and relative 
of the deceased. He was on friendly terms with 
all the occupants of his car. No protest "\Vas made 
by any one as to the speed or n1anner in vvhich 
he 'vas driving. There is no evidence that any one 
of .the passengers felt any apprehension o.f dan-
ger. There is no evidence that defendant willfully 
wi thdre"r his attention fron1 the road ...... Out of 
such a situation "'e are unable to spell \villful-
ness either of act or 01nission. ~I ere unconscious 
inattention, under the circurnstances disclosed 
here, and up to the 1110111ent of .the 'varning by 
the passenger in the front seat-and nothing more 
1·! 
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is shown by the evidence-is not an omission of 
such character as to justify a finding that one 
could be guilty of such inattention and at the same 
time have a natural and normal concern for the 
safety of others who might be harmed as a result 
of it. In other words, it is not wanton." Reversed. 
Q!1b 
I~o·u·e v. Vander Kolk,J?Jt!f N.\V. 788, (Mich.) 
About 9 :30 o'clock p.rn., while driving within the 
li1nits of a city on a highway that was lighted, defendant 
was attempting to defrost his windshield by placing the 
pahn of his hand upon it when he suddenly can1e upon 
a slow moving truck and trailer, vv-hich was properly 
lighted. He did not see the truck until he was within 15 
feet of it, an dsince he "\vas traveling about 40 miles per 
hour, he was unable to avoid a collision although he 
applied the brakes at once. Plaintiff, who was asleep in 
the front seat beside the defendant, was injured. The 
trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the 
grounds that there was no evidence of defendant's gross 
negligence or wanton or wilful misconduct and therefore 
recovery was barred under the provisions of the guest 
statute. This was affirmed by the Suprerne Court. 
At the close of all the evidence, and after both sides 
had rested, the defendant moved the court to direct a 
verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff (R. 
p. 100) on the grounds and for the reasons that the plain-
tiff had not sustained her burden of proving that the 
defendant was guilty of "\vilful ruisconduct. What she 
may have succeeded in proving \vas that defendant was 
guilty of an act of momentary inadvertence \Vhich rnight 
be negligent, but did not an1onnt to wulful rnisconduct. 
lG 
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Nothing more is shown. In view of that fact and the 
authorities cited above, it is clear that the lower court 
should have granted the defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LEROY G. 
BENNETT'S TESTIMONY OVER THE OBJECTION OF 
COUNSEL. 
LeRoy Bennett, police officer in Ogden, Utah, inves~ 
tigated this accident. The objectionable portion of his 
testimony is set forth below. 
"Q. Sergeant Bennett, can you give us some 
opinion as to the speed the car might have 
been traveling under the circumstances' 
~IR. HANSON: If your honor please, we also 
object to that as calling for a conclusion. I 
don't think the sergeant could tell that. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. You 
can determine fro1n your cross examination. 
You may answer. 
A. Do you want my opinion, or do you want what 
I was told~ 
Q. Your opinion~ 
THE COURT: Your opinion. 
Q. Now, Sergeant Bennett-. 
THE COlJRT: (Interposing) Now, just a 
mo1nen t. \..,. ou asked hin1 for an opinion. 
J\. l\lr opinion would be that the car was travel-
ing around 60 miles per hour. 
In his testi1uony, he gaYe a detailed outline of the 
physical facts \vhieh he found. '1_1his testimony is sum-
lG 
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rnarized under !>oint I of this argu1nent and will not be 
repeated here. It will suffice to say that the jury was 
adequately informed of the path of the vehicle, the dis-
tance involved, the objects struck, the "\Veather conditions, 
the nature of the ground over which the vehicle travelled 
and the results of his interrogation. The conclusion he 
gave as to the speed of the vehicle was clearly unwar-
ranted. F'rom what appears in the record the jury was 
as capable as the officer in deterrnining the speed of this 
vehicle under the circumstances of this case and the 
opinion given was an unwarranted invasion of the prov-
ince of the jury. 
It is true, of course, as general principle of law that 
opinion evidence is allo,ved by experts in matters which 
are technical and where the opinion will aid the jury in 
its determination of the ultimate question. And, the 
courts generally allow law enforcement officers to state 
their opinion as to the speed of vehicles based on the 
brake marks found at the scene of an accident. There is 
authority for allowing this type of opinion evidence. 
23 ALR 2d 112. But it is clear that the factors used in 
deter1nining speed from brake marks remain relatively 
constant and the average law enforcement officer is able 
to familiarize himself with existing studies of road sur-
faces and braking distances wjthout having any special 
training in this field. It must he borne in mind however, 
that these studies used by enforcement officers are based 
on factors such as road surfaces, reaction tirne in the 
average individual, and coefficient of friction in different 
weather conditions which rP1nain relatively constant and 
17 
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are compiled by experts in the field. 
In the case at bar, the automobile traveled on a 
parkway lined with trees, planted in lawn and inter-
spersed with driveways into the various residences. It 
was also found that the automobile had sideswiped two 
trees and it is not shown whether the vehicle was being 
braked after it left the parkway and reentered the high-
way or whether it was rolling free. The surface of the 
parking was shown to be wet which would, of course, 
materially reduce the coefficient friction. It is to be 
noted at this point that the factors in this situation are 
not constant but are unique to this case. 
Furthermore, the officer was not shown to possess 
any special qualifications in this field other than the 
fact that he has investigated numerous accidents. No 
experiments were made with this vehicle by the officer 
and indeed it would be impossible for him to experiment 
because the circumstances of this accident could never 
be duplicated. 
In view of the fact that the officer did not possess 
the qualifications necessary to n1ake this opinion and 
the further fact that the circumstances under which this 
accident happened can in no way be related to any 
accepted study of speeds in relations to brake marks, 
road surfaces and reaction tin1e, it must therefore be con-
cluded that a proper foundation was not laid for the 
opinion and it was error to ad1nit it. 
That the error 'vas prejudicial is readily seen. The 
speed at which an auto1nobile is being operated is one of 
the vital factors which go into tl1e determination of 
18 
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whether the vehicle is being operated with due regard to 
the rights of others. An opinion given by a law enforce-
ment officer who vvould normally be a distinterested 
witness would be given more vveight by the jury than 
,vould the testimony of the defendant. In the jury's 
deliberation on the evidence presented this one element 
could.have been a deciding factor and as has been noted, 
it is a material factor. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY, AND PARTICULARLY INTI-IE GIV-
ING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
Included a1nong the court's instructions to the jury 
is Instruction No. 16, which is set forth in full below: 
"No. 16 
In order to assist you in determining this 
case, _the following definitions and explanations 
are g1ven: 
A) Whenever in my instructions I state that 
the burden, or the burden of proof, rests upon a 
certain party to prove a certain allegation made 
by him, the meaning of such an instruction is this : 
That unless the truth of that allegation is proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall find 
the same to be not true. 
B) The term "preponderance of evidence," 
means such evidence as, when weighed with that 
opposed to it, has 1nore convincing force, and 
from which it results that the greater probability 
of truth lies therein. 
C) The proxirnate cause of an injury is that 
cause which in natural and continuous sequence 
unbroken by any efficient intervening rause: 
19 
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produces the injury, and without which the result 
would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause, 
the one that necessarily sets in operation the fac-
tors that accomplish the injury. It Inay operate 
directly or through intern1ediate agencies or 
through conditions created by such agencies. 
D) Negligence is the doing of some act which 
a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the 
failure to do something which a reasonably pru-
dent person would do, actuated by those con-
siderations which ordinarily regulate the conduct 
of human affairs. It is the failure to use ordinary 
care in the mange1nen t of one's property or per-
son. 
Negligence is not an absolute ter1n, but a 
relative one; by this we mean that in deciding 
whether there was negligence (wilful miscon-
duct)* in this case the conduct in question must be 
considered in the light of all the surrounding 
circumstances, as sho,vn by the evidence. This 
rule rests on the self-evident fact that a reason-
ably prudent person 'vill react differently to dif-
ferent circumstances. Those circumstances enter 
in to and, in a sense, are a part of the conduct in 
question. An act negligent under one set of con-
ditions n1ight not be so under another. There-
fore, to arrive a.t a fair standard, 've ask: "VVhat 
conduct miglit reasonably have been expected of 
a person of ordinary prudence under the same 
criterion by 'v-hich to detern1ine whether or not 
the evidence before us proves negligence. 
E) Inasmuch as the a1nount of caution used 
by the ordinarily prudent person varies in dire~t 
porportion to the danger known to be involved 1n 
his undertaking, it follo,vs that in the exercise of 
* The words "wilful misconduct" were entered by interlineation 
by judge. 
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ordinary care the an1ount of caution required \Vill 
vary in accordance with the nature of the act and 
the surrounding circun1stances. To put the matter 
in another way, the an1ount of caution required 
by the law increases as does the danger that rea-
sonably should be apprehended. 
F) ''Ordinary care" is that degree of care 
\Vhich a reasonably pruden person would use 
under the same or similar circumstances. Ordi-
nary care" implies the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence and such watchfulness, caution and fore-
sight as under all the circumstances of the partic-
ular case would be exercised by a reasonably pru-
dent, careful person. 
G) The law does not mean that it seeks and 
recognizes only one proxirnate cause of an injury, 
consisting of only one factor, one act, one element 
of circumstances, or the conduct of only one per-
son. To the contrary, the acts and omissions of 
two or more persons may work concurrently as 
the efficient causes of an injury, and in such a 
case, each of the participating acts or omissions 
is regarded in law as a proximate cause." 
It is at once clear, upon reading the foregoing in-
struction, tliat the legal terms therein explained pertain 
to a simple negligence action, and cannot by any method 
of legal logic or subtlety of argument have application to 
the case at bar. The concept of ordinarily negligence and 
\vilful misconduct connote standards of care which differ 
not only in degree, but also are distinguished by the state 
of mind or knowledge of the actor. By instructing the 
jury on the legal definition applicahle to the negligent 
acts of one guilty of a tort, the court entirely ignored the 
concept of wilful misconduct, and thPreby delirnited and 
foreclosed in the 1ninds of the jury th~ necessary legal 
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elements of the case. 
This instruction was duly excepted to by the defend-
ant (R. p. 10'3). 
And, too, the instant error effects the basic and sole 
issue in this case; namely, the legal duty owned to plain-
tiff by defendant. The materiality of that issue is clear. 
That an erroneous instruction concerning that issue is 
prejudicial to the defendant, is likewise clear. We are 
not unmindful of the fact that the trial. court in other 
instructions alluded to the doctrine of wilful misconduct. 
Whether those instructions correctly state the law need 
not be determined, because this court has long held the 
view that instructions which are contradictory or conflict-
ing are prejudicially erroneous if they effect a material ....... 
issue in the case, and this rule obtains even if the law is 
correctly stated at one point in the instructions; and the 
defeat is not cured by an instruction requiring the jury 
to view the instructions as a whole. 
In the early case of Konold vs. Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co., 60 Pac. 1021 (Utah), this court adopted the 
following rule in regard to inconsistent instructions: 
"Instructions on a 1naterial point in a case 
which are inconsistent or contradictory should not 
be given. The giving of such instructions is e:r~r 
and a sufficient ground for reversal because 1t 1s 
in1possible after the verdict to ascertain which 
' ' . instructions the jury follo,ved or 'vhat Influence 
the erroneous instruction had in their delibera-
tion. This has been so uniforn1ly held that cita-
tions a.re unnecessary." 
Jensen v. [ltaJ~ Ry Co., 2·70 Pac. 349 (l-:-tah). This 
\Vas an action for injuries sustained by a child of tender 
22. 
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years against the railroad for the negligence of its train 
operatives. At the close of evidence, plaintiff requested 
instructions to the effect that the train operatives had 
a duty to observe and avoid injuries to persons in the 
vicinity of the tracks, which instructions were given. 
Defendant, on the other hand, requested instruction to 
the effect that the defendant was not required to antici-
pate the presence of and owed no duty until actual dis-
covery, vvhich instructions vvere likewise given. "_l1he trial 
below resulted in a verdict for the defendant. The court 
held in substance that the instructions were conflicting 
and that a nevv trial was ordered for this and other 
reasons. 
State v. Hendricks, 259 P. 2d, 452 (Utah). This was 
a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. The instruc-
tions of the trial court at the close of the evidence tended 
to shift the burden upon the defendant to show his inno-
cence beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held: 
"The fact that elsewhere in the instruction 
the jury were correctly instructed on the pre-
sumption of innocence does not cure the instant 
error. Although the instructions are to be con-
sidered as a whole, where they are in irreconcila-
ble conflict, they could but mislead or confuse the 
jury." 
The conviction reversed and remanded for a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in this action do not show wilful rnisconduct 
on the part of the defendant. The evidence in its entirety, 
and -all the inferences to be gained therefrorn, vie,ved in 
23. 
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a light most favorable to the plaintiff, sho\v a vehicle 
being operated in a careful and prudent manner up to a 
point where defendant inadvertently dropped a lighted 
cigarette. Reasonable minds, under those facts, could 
reach but on conclusion, and that is that the ele1nent of 
wilful misconduct (The intentional doing of an act, or 
intentional omission, or failing to do an act, with knowl-
edge that serious injury is a probable, and not merely 
a possible result; or the intentional doing of an act with 
wan ton and reckless disregard of the possible conse-
quences), is absent from this case. The lower court, 
therefore, erred in not directing a verdict for the defend-
ant and against the plaintiff pursuant to defendant's 
motion at the close of all the evidence. 
Defendant contends that the only reasonable deci-
sion of this factual situation necessitates a reversal of 
the trial court, with instructions to enter a verdict for 
the defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of 
action. However, in the event the court disagrees with 
the reasoning herein eontained under Point I of this 
brief, defendant urges the court to grant a new trial in 
this rna tter on the grounds that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the la\v appli-
cable to the evidence. Under the instructions, the jury 
was at liherty· to find that the duty o'vned to the plaintiff 
by the defendant 'Yas to avoid acts of sin1ple negligence, 
and this clearly 'vas prejudicial error justifying the 
granting of a ne'v trial. 
R,espectfully subn1itted, 
srrElV-1\RT, c:ANNON & IIANSON, 
.A ttornr~lJS for .llppellant. 
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